The Michigan Court of Appeals is publishing Lee v. Robinson (Case No. 252476; March 25, 2004). The court held that since the mother was missing (incapacitated and incompetent) rather than dead, her sister lacked standing to petition for custody of her child.
The panel writes (excerpt):
Plaintiff’s only contention on appeal is that the circuit court erred in ruling that Moyer did not have standing to seek custody of the child pursuant to MCL 722.26c. We disagree. This is a question of statutory interpretation which we review de novo. Wood v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 469 Mich 401, 403; 668 NW2d 353 (2003).
MCL 722.26c states, in pertinent part:
(1) A third person may bring an action for custody of a child if the court finds . . . the following:
* * *
(b) All of the following:
(i) The child’s biological parents have never been married to one another.
(ii) The child’s parent who has custody of the child dies or is missing and the other parent has not been granted legal custody under court order.
(iii) The third person is related to the child within the fifth degree by marriage, blood, or adoption.
It is undisputed that subsections (i) and (iii) are satisfied in this case. Moyer, on behalf of plaintiff, argues that subsection (ii) is also satisfied because due to plaintiff’s coma, she is “missing.” The plain language of the statute does not support this contention.
In interpreting a statute, the obligation of this Court is to discern the legislative intent from the words actually used in the statute. Rakestraw v Gen Dynamics Land Sys, 469 Mich 220, 224; 666 NW2d 199 (2003). “A bedrock principle of statutory construction is that a clear and unambiguous statute leaves no room for judicial construction or interpretation.” Id. at 224, quoting Coleman v Gurwin, 443 Mich 59, 65; 503 NW2d 435 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). In construing the statute, it is this Court’s obligation to review the words used in the statute and give those words their plain and ordinary meanings. See Stone v State, 467 Mich 288, 291; 651 NW2d 64 (2002).
The language of MCL 722.26c(1)(b)(ii) is clear. In order for a third-party family member to have standing in a custody proceeding, the custodial parent must either be dead or missing. MCL 722.26c. Plaintiff is not dead, so the question is whether she may be considered “missing” for purposes of MCL 722.26c(1)(ii). Unless defined in the statute, every word of a statute should be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, considering the context in which the word is used. MCL 8.3a, Robertson v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 465 Mich 732, 748; 641 NW2d 567 (2002). Because the term “missing” is not defined in the statute, we may turn to dictionary definitions to aid in the general goal of construing a term in accordance with its ordinary meaning and generally accepted use. Sands Appliance Servs v Wilson, 463 Mich 231, 240; 615 NW2d 241 (2000), quoting People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Oxford dictionary defines “missing” as “absent and unable to be found.” Oxford Color Dictionary (2d ed) (2001).
Plaintiff is not “missing” within the plain meaning of the word. Plaintiff is not absent, and she most certainly can be found. Plaintiff is incapacitated and incompetent. This Court must respect the plain language of the statute. Stone, supra at 291. Given that plaintiff is not missing under the plain meaning of the word, upon a de novo review, we find Moyer does not have standing to seek custody of the child pursuant to MCL 722.26c.