The Michigan court of appeals is publishing ESTATE OF CHERYL A. ROWLEY a/k/a CHERYL A. MAC INNES, v. JOE DEE MAC INNES (January 8, 2004, Case No. 241649). A waiver of life insurance proceeds in a consent judgment of divorce releases the former spouse’s rights. Neff writes (excerpt):
Defendant appeals by delayed leave an order of the trial court directing him to pay over to plaintiff $95,000 in life insurance proceeds he received upon the death of his former wife, Cheryl Rowley, where she failed to change the beneficiary designation on her life insurance policy after the couple’s divorce. The court concluded that a provision in the consent judgment of divorce, releasing all rights of either party to the proceeds of any life insurance on the other, waived defendant’s right to Rowley’s life insurance proceeds. We affirm.
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Having concurred with the majority view in the federal circuits and concluded that giving effect to the above provision does not compromise the purpose and goals of ERISA, Melton, supra at 945, we hold that defendant waived his rights to the life insurance proceeds at issue and thus is not entitled to retain them. The above provision is all-inclusive with regard to defendant’s relinquishment of his right to life insurance proceeds from policies owned by his former wife: “[E]xcept as otherwise provided, all rights . . . to the proceeds of any policy . . . of life insurance . . . shall hereupon become and be payable to the estate of the owner of said policy . . . ” This language is explicit in its intent to divest defendant of his interest in life insurance proceeds from policies owned by Rowley. Thomas v Detroit Retirement System, 246 Mich App 155, 160-161; 631 NW2d 349 (2001); Massachusetts Indemnity, supra at 268; see also Clift, supra (no “magic words” necessary for effective waiver). In our view, giving effect to the waiver best serves the ends of justice where a divorcing couple’s intent is clear. Silber, supra at 403-404.
We find no merit in defendant’s argument that the trial court erroneously viewed the consent judgment of divorce as a contract. As the trial court recognized, a divorce judgment entered by consent is in the nature of a contract, and a settlement agreement, i.e., a stipulation and property settlement, is a contract . . . .