The Michigan Supreme Court issued Harvey v. Harvey (Case No. 124234; June 9, 2004). The court held that “[r]egardless of the type of alternative dispute resolution that parties use, the Child Custody Act requires the circuit court to determine independently what custodial placement is in the best interests of the children.”
The per curiam opinion states (excerpt):
The Child Custody Act is a comprehensive statutory scheme for resolving custody disputes. Van v Zahorik, 460 Mich 320, 327; 597 NW2d 15 (1999). With it, the Legislature sought to “promote the best interests and welfare of children.” Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 877; 526 NW2d 889 (1994). The act applies to all custody disputes and vests the circuit court with continuing jurisdiction. MCL 722.26.
The act makes clear that the best interests of the child control the resolution of a custody dispute between parents, as gauged by the factors set forth at MCL 722.23. MCL 722.25(1). It places an affirmative obligation on the circuit court to “declare the child’s inherent rights and establish the rights and duties as to the child’s custody, support, and parenting time in accordance with this act” whenever the court is required to adjudicate an action “involving dispute of a minor child’s custody.” MCL 722.24(1); Van, supra at 328. Taken together, these statutory provisions impose on the trial court the duty to ensure that the resolution of any custody dispute is in the best interests of the child.
Thus, we affirm the Court of Appeals decision to remand this case to the circuit court for a hearing de novo, but not for the reason stated by the Court of Appeals. It is irrelevant that the parties did not have a “valid agreement for binding arbitration or an otherwise valid waiver of procedural requirements . . . .” 257 Mich App 292. The Child Custody Act required the circuit court to determine the best interests of the children before entering an order resolving the custody dispute.
Our holding should not be interpreted, where the parties have agreed to a custody arrangement, to require the court to conduct a hearing or otherwise engage in intensive fact-finding. See MCL 552.513(2) and 600.5080(1). Our requirement under such circumstances is that the court satisfy itself concerning the best interests of the children. When the court signs the order, it indicates that it has done so. A judge signs an order only after profound deliberation and in the exercise of the judge’s traditional broad discretion. See Greene v Greene, 357 Mich 196, 202; 98 NW2d 519 (1959).
However, the deference due parties’ negotiated agreements does not diminish the court’s obligation to examine the best interest factors and make the child’s best interests paramount. MCL 722.25(1). Nothing in the Child Custody Act gives parents or any other party the power to exclude the legislatively mandated “best interests” factors from the court’s deliberations once a custody dispute reaches the court.
Furthermore, neither the Friend of the Court Act nor the domestic relations arbitration act relieves the circuit court of its duty to review a custody arrangement once the issue of a child’s custody reaches the bench. The Friend of the Court Act states that the circuit court “shall” hold a hearing de novo to review a friend of the court recommendation if either party objects to that recommendation in writing within twenty-one days. MCL 552.507(5).
Likewise, MCL 600.5080 authorizes a circuit court to modify or vacate an arbitration award that is not in the best interests of the child. It requires the circuit court to review the arbitration award in accordance with the requirements of other relevant statutes, including the Child Custody Act. The court retains authority over custody until the child reaches the age of majority. MCL 722.27(1)(c).
Thus, even when parties initially elect to submit a custody dispute to an arbitrator or to the friend of the court, they cannot waive the authority that the Child Custody Act confers on the circuit court. As the Court of Appeals has previously explained, parties “cannot by agreement usurp the court’s authority to determine suitable provisions for the child’s best interests.” Lombardo v Lombardo, 202 Mich App 151, 160; 507 NW2d 788 (1993). See also Napora v Napora, 159 Mich App 241, 246; 406 NW2d 197 (1986). Permitting the parties, by stipulation, to limit the trial court’s authority to review custody determinations would nullify the protections of the Child Custody Act and relieve the circuit court of its statutorily imposed responsibilities.