The Michigan Court of Appeals is publishing Miller v Miller, a 2-1 decision on domestic relations arbitration (Case No. 242470; November 30, 2004). The issue was whether a domestic relations litigant was bound by an “arbitral award� when the arbitrator used a caucus method, meeting with the parties, ex parte, in an effort to settle the case. The court decided that the trial court should have vacated the arbitral award because the arbitrator failed to follow the unambiguous provisions of the DRAA.
Saad writes (excerpt):
Most importantly to our holding, in language that specifies that a domestic relations litigant who gives up her right to litigate her matter in court shall have a full and fair arbitral hearing, the DRAA unambiguously provides that:
An arbitrator appointed under this chapter shall hear and make an award on each
issue submitted for arbitration under the arbitration agreement subject to the
provisions of the agreement. [MCL 600.5074(1) (emphasis added).]
With respect to the defendant’s contention and the trial court’s erroneous holding that ex parte meetings with the parties satisfy this statutory mandate for “hearing,� we hold that the DRAA is clear and unambiguous in requiring a hearing. Id. A party who gives up her right to litigate her case in court, including substantial discovery and appellate rights, in exchange for binding arbitration may not be deprived of her right to present her case before a neutral arbitrator. To underscore this clear mandate, Section 5076 of the DRAA requires the arbitrator to meet with the parties to discuss the scope of the issues, the date, time and place of the hearing, including witnesses and experts who may testify, and a schedule for exchange of expert reports or summary of expert testimony. By this provision, our Legislature clearly expressed its intent that the arbitrator and the parties would meet and prepare thoroughly for a full and fair hearing. Indeed, MCL 600.5076 serves as the functional equivalent of a “pretrial conference� so the parties can plan to present their case at the arbitral hearing. For us to hold that the DRAA requires this preparatory meeting, but not the hearing itself, would do an injustice to the legislative scheme and the parties. Further, in reviewing the grounds for vacation of an arbitral award under the DRAA, we note, importantly, that the statute requires a court to vacate an award when:
the arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing on a showing of sufficient cause
[or] refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise conducted
the hearing to prejudice substantially a party’s right.
In the face of this strong legislative direction to our judiciary to ensure fair hearings for domestic relations parties who choose arbitration, a trial court simply must overturn any award where the arbitrator has denied either party his or her statutory right to a hearing. It would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the DRAA to mandate that our courts vacate arbitral awards where arbitrators unfairly denied parties’ requests for adjournment, unfairly refused to hear evidence, or unfairly conducted the hearing, but to nonetheless affirm awards where parties were denied their right to any hearing whatsoever. Indeed, to do so would be contrary to the plain language of the statute and contrary to the interests of parties in domestic relations litigation.
In order to keep faith with our Legislature’s intent, courts and arbitrators must proceed in full compliance with the DRAA. Efforts at settlement, mediation, or “shuttle diplomacy� simply will not satisfy the plain language of the statute. Under the DRAA, nothing short of a full and fair hearing will suffice. To satisfy this express language, and the purpose of the DRAA, absent a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to a hearing, our courts and arbitrators must ensure full compliance with the protections of the DRAA.